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GIGGIN’ IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Haley Ford*
I. INTRODUCTION
The labor market within the United States is currently undergoing a
massive transformation. Historically, the predominate labor model was that
of the employer-employee work arrangement, where individuals worked
long-term for only a single, or few, employers over the course of their ca-
reers. Now, however, in response to the rise in digitalism and wide-spread
access to technology, the labor market is shifting away from the traditional
employer-employee model to a model characterized by its flexibility, auton-
omy, and on-demand nature.1 This emerging labor market is known as “the
gig economy,” and it is premised upon “greater efficiency, productivity, and
competitiveness.”2 The gig economy currently represents “the fastest grow-
ing segment of the labor market,”3 with “more than 45 million Americans”
having at least once participated in it as a worker.4 As one scholar put it,
“th[is] move to insecure, irregular jobs represents the most profound eco-
nomic change” since the mid-1900’s.5
However, the rapid emergence of the gig economy carries with it a
number of taxation consequences stemming from the fact that our existing
labor classification framework is constructed around “the assumption of full
time employment.”6 Since this emerging labor market is detached from the
traditional employer-employee model of the past, gig economy workers are
not classified as “employees” for income tax purposes under present defini-
tions. Instead, gig economy workers are classified as “independent contrac-
tors,” or “small-business owners.”7 This classification carries with it many
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Emphasis Biochemistry, Montana State University, 2013. A very special thank you to Professor Pippa
Browde for her valuable insights into tax policy and for her guidance and encouragement throughout the
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1. Emily C. Atmore, Killing the Goose That Laid the Golden Egg: Outdated Employment Laws
Are Destroying the Gig Economy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 887, 888 (2017).
2. Robert Kuttner, The Task Rabbit Economy, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Oct. 10, 2013), https://
perma.cc/KN3U-8G4U.
3. Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Taxing the Gig Economy, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1415, 1420 (2018).
4. CAROLINE BRUCKNER, Shortchanged: The Tax Compliance Challenges of Small Business Oper-
ators Driving the On-Demand Platform Economy 4 (2016).
5. Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy & The Future of Employment and Labor Law, 51 U.S.F. L. REV.
51, 54 n.16 (2017) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kuttner, supra note 2).
6. Arun Sundararajan, Crowd-Based Capitalism, Digital Automation, and the Future of Work,
2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 487, 488–89.
7. Thomas, supra note 3, at 1417–18.
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legal responsibilities that do not accurately reflect the nature of gig econ-
omy employment, and as such, our tax policy “must be fundamentally re-
conceptualized.”8
Against this backdrop and based upon an analysis of fairness and com-
plexity principles, this comment argues for several tax policy changes that
should be implemented immediately in order to address some of the most
pressing concerns gig economy workers presently face under current labor
classifications. Part II provides a background of the gig economy while ex-
plaining the legal rationale behind the present classification of gig economy
workers as independent contractors. Part II then illustrates the mechanics of
a standard gig economy transaction generally, concluding with a side-by-
side comparison of a gig economy worker and a similarly-situated em-
ployee. Part III begins with a brief introduction of the tax policy principles
of fairness and complexity within the context of the gig economy, followed
by an introduction of three of the system’s primary inadequacies: the pay-
ment of income taxes, difficulties associated with claiming available deduc-
tions, and added complexity due to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017
(“TCJA”).9 Part IV presents and analyzes a series of solutions that, if imple-
mented together, would significantly alleviate some of the most immediate
issues caused by the system’s primary inadequacies. Part V concludes with
what the future may hold for gig economy workers.
II. THE RISE OF THE GIG ECONOMY
While the phrase “the gig economy” is necessarily broad, understand-
ing its origins provides insight into its increasingly prevalent role in the
labor market and assists in understanding the consequences flowing from
the “independent contractor” label. Following the discussion of the gig
economy’s background, this comment then analyzes a typical gig economy
transaction, both on its own and in comparison with an employee perform-
ing the same type of work, in order to clarify and distinguish the responsi-
bilities of gig economy workers.
A. An Overview of the Gig Economy
The term “gig economy,” also known as the “sharing economy,”10 de-
scribes an emerging labor market that shares the characteristics of “flexible,
autonomous, and short-term” employment.11 Gig economy workers are usu-
8. Sundararajan, supra note 6.
9. Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11011, 131 Stat. 2054, 2063–72.
10. National Taxpayer Advocate 2017 Annual Report to Congress, I.R.S. Pub. No. 2104, at 165
(2017).
11. Atmore, supra note 1, at 888.
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ally paid by the task, instead of by the hour, and often work multiple gig-
type jobs at the same time.12 Overall, there is no singular defining charac-
teristic of a gig economy worker, as these individuals come from a wide
variety of backgrounds, with great variation in education, skills, socio-eco-
nomic status, preferences, and needs.13
The gig economy arose within the context of the technological boom
in America, coupled with societal factors such as an increasingly mobile
population and a shift away from the traditional “career” employment
model towards a more transitive multi-job expectation.14 To put it in per-
spective, as the fastest growing segment of the labor market, the gig econ-
omy is set “to at least double by 2020.”15 Furthermore, this sector of the
economy is projected to exponentially increase in revenue world-wide,
from $15 billion to $335 billion between 2013 and 2025.16 As such, the gig
economy has the potential to affect all Americans—a situation for which
our present tax policy framework is not prepared to handle.
Our current classification system for gig economy workers for taxation
purposes is imperfect. On a spectrum with “employee” on one end (where
the employer assumes responsibility over the majority of tax requirements),
and “independent contractor” or “small business owner” on the other end
(where the independent contractor/business owner accepts—and is prepared
for—all the added responsibilities of tax compliance), the gig economy
worker falls somewhere in between the two. However, given the dichotomy
of our current workforce classification system, since gig economy workers
do not fall under the traditional employer-employee work arrangement, by
default, they are labeled as “independent contractors” for taxation pur-
poses.17 This classification as an “independent contractor” or “small busi-
ness owner” carries many consequences for the gig economy worker.18
The availability of this type of contingent work arrangement provides
much-needed economic support for individuals during temporary gaps in
employment or when earnings dip.19 However, with this looser work ar-
rangement also comes the removal of many of the worker protections devel-
oped over the last century, in addition to unfavorable tax policy treatment.
12. Seth D. Harris, Workers, Protections, and Benefits in the U.S. Gig Economy, 2018 GLOB. L.
REV. 7, 11.
13. Lobel, supra note 5, at 57.
14. Id. at 52, 56–57.
15. Thomas, supra note 3, at 1420 (based on 2016 figures).
16. Nina E. Olson, Participants in the Sharing Economy Lack Adequate Guidance from the IRS,
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE (June 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/R8DX-NV8U.
17. Jennifer Pinsof, A New Take on an Old Problem: Employee Misclassification in the Modern
Gig-Economy, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 341, 352 (2016).
18. These consequences are discussed infra Part III.
19. Harris, supra note 12, at 31.
3
Ford: Giggin' in the 21st Century
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2019
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\80-2\MON206.txt unknown Seq: 4  1-AUG-19 12:22
302 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 80
These worker protections, such as minimum wage and overtime laws, regu-
lated fringe benefits, unemployment insurance, anti-discrimination rules,
Social Security, collective bargaining rights, and health and safety stan-
dards, for example, “were ‘layered’ on top of the normal employment con-
tract” and were “predicated on the assumption of a standard workweek.”20
Because these worker protections are tied to a traditional employer-em-
ployee work arrangement, gig economy workers—classified as “indepen-
dent contractors” or “small business owners”—are left in the precarious
position where they perform much of the same work as their employee
counterparts, but without the protections and tax treatment conferred by
“employee” status. In sum, the gig economy’s novel structure circumvents
the society-wide protections built into the traditional employment model,
leaving an entire subset of workers in a novel and unprotected position.
B. The Mechanics of a Standard Gig Economy Transaction
A typical gig economy transaction involves coordination between
three parties: (1) the service provider; (2) the service recipient; and (3) the
service coordinator.21 The service recipient contacts the service coordinator,
usually a third-party platform, requesting some type of task be performed.
The service coordinator then communicates that request to its service prov-
iders, the gig economy workers, who then choose whether or not to perform
the service. Some service coordinators, like TaskRabbit, allow the service
providers to bid on the requested service by posting rates for specific jobs
(without TaskRabbit’s service charge included),22 while others, like Uber,
predetermine the cost of the service.23 Although there are many examples
of service coordinators, this comment will focus primarily on TaskRabbit as
an example.24
TaskRabbit is an online service platform providing a “convenient [and]
affordable way to get things done around the home” by “instantly con-
nect[ing] you with skilled Taskers to help with odd-jobs and errands, so you
can be more productive, every day.”25 Unlike other service coordinators
who retain full control over the service charge, TaskRabbit allows its ser-
vice providers, known as “Taskers,” to bid on each individual service re-
20. Kuttner, supra note 2.
21. Olson, supra note 16. These terms refer to the gig economy worker, the customer, and the
platform, respectively, and will be used interchangeably throughout this comment. In addition, this com-
ment interchangeably uses the terms “small business owner,” “gig worker,” and “self-employed” to refer
to the service providers.
22. How to Hire a Tasker, TASKRABBIT, https://perma.cc/NL4Z-5RZL (last updated Apr. 4, 2019).
23. Riding with Uber: Upfront Pricing, UBER, https://perma.cc/ME2Q-BFF9.
24. However, in the vast world of service coordinators, each discrete type of platform entails a set
of issues particular to that structure.
25. Revolutionizing Everyday Work, TASKRABBIT, https://perma.cc/DM94-WC5S.
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quested, thereby permitting its service providers to individually value their
work.
The basic structure of a TaskRabbit transaction begins with a service
recipient (a “client”) using their smart phone or computer to request any
one of a variety of services offered by the platform, such as moving, pack-
ing, general handyman help, home improvement, grocery shopping, and
even pet-sitting.26 Once a request has been submitted, it is transmitted to the
local Taskers who possess the specific skills fitting the client’s request for
service. The Taskers interested in taking the job submit bids, with the client
ultimately selecting one Tasker, based on the Tasker’s identified rate and
profile, to perform the task.27 The Tasker coordinates with the client, per-
haps purchases supplies for the task, and completes the task as requested.28
The client pays via the TaskRabbit app, and TaskRabbit then pays the
Tasker, after taking a percentage of the income.29 However, despite gener-
ating revenue from these transactions, TaskRabbit disclaims that it “is not
an employment agency service or business” and “is not an employer of any
[Tasker].”30 By classifying its Taskers as independent contractors instead of
employees, TaskRabbit sidesteps any liability “for workers’ compensation
or any tax payments or withholding,”31 among other things, thus “avoiding
corporate responsibilities toward, and liabilities for, workers and consum-
ers.”32
To illustrate the difficulties gig economy workers face compared to
employees, consider the following two scenarios of a worker installing
cabinets, first as a gig economy worker, and second as an employee.
The Tasker who contracts to install cabinets in a client’s house bears
many responsibilities in ensuring that the job is completed satisfactorily and
that their work is fully compensated. This means that if the Tasker supplies
the cabinets and other materials, the Tasker must coordinate with the client
regarding desired materials and make sure to include all receipts of pur-
chased materials in the invoice to ensure reimbursement.33 Any personal
tools the Tasker uses may be subject to a depreciation deduction,34 while
most business expenses are likewise deductible,35 if the Tasker understands
26. TaskRabbit, TASKRABBIT, https://perma.cc/2J3B-BN43.
27. How to Hire a Tasker, supra note 22.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. TaskRabbit Terms of Service, TASKRABBIT, https://perma.cc/F63S-2VP5 (last updated Sept. 4,
2018).
31. Id.
32. Lobel, supra note 5, at 55.
33. TaskRabbit Terms of Service, supra note 30.
34. I.R.C. § 179 (2017).
35. Id. § 162.
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how to claim the deductions.36 With the income earned from installing the
cabinets, along with other gigs worked, the Tasker must make the requisite
quarterly payments to the IRS37 and must budget properly for any amounts
owed for self-employment taxes at the year’s end,38 all of which take time
and expertise to navigate.39 The Tasker must also self-enroll in the Market-
place for health insurance and add to any retirement accounts at their own
cost. However, if the Tasker gets injured on the job, they will not receive
any worker compensation or unemployment benefits.40 Similarly, the
Tasker is not protected by standard harassment, discrimination, or other
worker-protection laws.41
In contrast, an employee who works for a cabinet installing business
simply shows up at the pre-coordinated jobsite, uses employer-supplied
tools, and receives a paycheck with any withholding already applied. In
addition, the employee possibly enjoys employer-provided health insurance
and retirement contributions, and almost certainly is entitled to worker com-
pensation and unemployment should they be injured on the job, along with
the robust worker protection laws that arise from an employer-employee
relationship. These two workers, the Tasker and the employee, perform
identical jobs installing the cabinets, yet the cost to each is incredibly differ-
ent. This disparity in tax treatment directly affects the system’s fairness, as
will be discussed below, while also injecting significant uncertainty into the
gig economy worker’s life.
III. THE CHALLENGES FACING GIG ECONOMY WORKERS
The exceedingly quick proliferation of the gig economy across the
United States brought with it a number of challenges that, most simply put,
boil down to the fact that our tax policy has not yet caught up to the gig
economy, and thus does not accurately reflect the unique status of this sub-
set of workers. At the forefront of understanding how our present tax policy
fails to address the concerns of gig economy workers are the tax policy
36. See generally How to Depreciate Property, I.R.S. Pub. No. 946 (2018); Business Expenses,
I.R.S. Pub. No. 535 (2018).
37. I.R.C. § 6654(c).
38. BRUCKNER, supra note 4, at 11.
39. Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, User-Friendly Taxpaying, 92 IND. L.J. 1509, 1512 (2017) [herein-
after User-Friendly Taxpaying].
40. However, there are several recent proposals and initiatives aimed at addressing this very issue.
E.g., Portable Benefits for Independent Workers Pilot Program Act, S. 1251, 115th Cong. (1st Sess.
2017); Determinations of Worker Benefits and Employer Obligations Based on a Worker’s Status, H.
Bill 2812, 65th Leg., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018); see generally NATALIE FOSTER, GREG NELSON &
LIBBY REDER, PORTABLE BENEFITS RESOURCE GUIDE (Aspen Inst., Future of Work Initiative, 2016).
41. Catherine Tucciarello, The Square Peg Between Two Round Holes: Why California’s Tradi-
tional Right to Control Test is Not Relevant for On-Demand Workers, 13 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 351,
354 (2017).
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 80 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol80/iss2/6
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\80-2\MON206.txt unknown Seq: 7  1-AUG-19 12:22
2019 GIGGIN’ IN THE 21ST CENTURY 305
principles of fairness and complexity. While this comment primarily fo-
cuses on tax policy implications from the viewpoint of gig economy work-
ers, as a fast-emerging market sector, the gig economy poses additional tax
policy issues from the viewpoints of service coordinators and the IRS. This
comment then explores three of the present taxation system’s primary inad-
equacies with regard to gig economy workers: (1) the payment of income
taxes; (2) difficulties associated with deducting business expenses; and (3)
added complexity due to the TCJA.
A. Tax Policy Principles
The following addresses the tax policy principles of fairness, including
both horizontal equity and vertical equity, as well as complexity, which
includes a system’s administrative cost and compliance cost.
1. Fairness: Horizontal & Vertical Equity
Critical to analyzing a tax policy’s effects on gig economy workers is
the principle of fairness. The fairness of a tax system is judged on its hori-
zontal equity and its vertical equity, two prongs which provide distinct cri-
terion for evaluating a tax system’s treatment of taxpayers.42 Horizontal
equity demands that “similarly situated workers should be treated similarly
under law, just as similarly situated businesses should be regulated simi-
larly.”43 Horizontal equity’s comparison of “similarly situated” taxpayers
should not be read as comparing “identically situated” taxpayers.44 Rather,
a horizontal equity analysis involves comparison between taxpayers whose
circumstances are equivalent.45 Thus, horizontal equity requires that, after
taking into account individual taxpayers’ circumstances, “equally well-off
taxpayers be taxed equally.”46
The principle of vertical equity addresses a tax system’s treatment of
taxpayers with different levels of well-being.47 Within vertical equity is the
“ability to pay” principle, which provides a mechanism for evaluating well-
being based on economic terms.48 An example of vertical equity in our
present taxation system is its progressive rate structure, where households
42. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER
TAXES 87–88 (5th ed. 2017).
43. Harris, supra note 12, at 31.
44. David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43, 44
(2006).
45. Id. at 44–45.
46. Id. at 45 (emphasis original).
47. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 42, at 88.
48. Id. at 91.
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of increasing levels of income pay an increasing proportion of income tax.49
In sum, vertical equity avers that taxpayers with greater ability to pay
should bear more of the tax burden than those with lesser ability to pay.50
2. Complexity: Administrative Cost & Compliance Cost
Generally speaking, our tax system’s increasing complexity is a neces-
sary byproduct of Congress addressing the goals of tax policy, such as the
system’s fairness.51 A system becomes more complex as provisions are ad-
ded or modified in recognition of certain sets of circumstances that, in Con-
gress’ opinion, necessitate reflection in the tax code in pursuit of tax policy
goals.52 An example of this are the numerous deductions within the present
code, which encourage taxpayers to partake in preferred activities by re-
warding those activities through a reduction in tax burden.53 Deductions are
especially prevalent at the business level, where the tax code includes busi-
ness expense deductions, which are ordinary and necessary expenses busi-
nesses incur through operation.54 Additionally, the tax code includes more
industry-specific provisions as well as depreciation deductions, which en-
able business taxpayers to recover the cost of new equipment over an artifi-
cially shorter timespan than it would otherwise take, in order to encourage
new purchases.55 Although these provisions add to the complexity of a tax-
ation system, they serve an important role in addressing the discrete and
unique circumstances of taxpayers.
However, increasing a system’s complexity is not without its costs.
Specifically, when a tax system becomes more complex, its administrative
cost and compliance cost increase.56 The administrative cost refers to the
government’s cost incurred in collecting taxes, meaning everything that
falls within the IRS’ budget.57 The compliance cost refers to the costs in-
curred by taxpayers in paying taxes.58 This includes money spent on ac-
countants, tax software, and tax education, but it also includes the taxpay-
ers’ time spent on the taxpaying process, which could otherwise be used for
49. Id. at 88–89.
50. Id. at 88.
51. Urban Institute & Brookings Institution, Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, TAX POLICY
CENTER, https://perma.cc/2LCP-625Y. Note that increasing complexity is not always a necessary by-
product of addressing tax policy goals, but in general, this is the cause of increasing complexity.
52. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 42, at 241.
53. Id.
54. Deducting Business Expenses, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://perma.cc/5TL4-833U (last
updated Nov. 5, 2018).
55. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 42, at 61–62.
56. Id. at 230–31.
57. Id. at 230.
58. Id. at 230–31.
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personal pursuits or work.59 In sum, a system’s complexity necessarily in-
creases as a result of pursing a fairer system that more specifically ad-
dresses certain behaviors and situations of taxpayers.
B. A Specific Examination of the System’s Primary Inadequacies
Together, the tax policy principles of fairness and complexity guide
the following exploration of how our present tax system inadequately ad-
dresses the reality of gig economy workers, focusing on the payment of
income taxes, difficulties associated with business expense deductions, and
added complexity due to the TCJA’s addition of § 199A to the tax code.
1. Understanding the Payment of Income Taxes
Presently, the classification of gig economy workers as independent
contractors violates fairness principles in multiple ways. Primarily, this is
seen in the lack of horizontal equity, which mandates that a “tax system
should treat similarly situated taxpayers similarly” by “impos[ing] similar
tax burdens on similarly situated taxpayers.”60 By classifying gig economy
workers as independent contractors, which, for tax purposes, means that
they are small business owners,61 the legal incidence of tax compliance
(meaning who is legally responsible for remitting a tax)62 shifts from the
employer to the gig economy worker. This means that instead of the em-
ployer bearing the compliance cost of navigating withholding laws and be-
coming knowledgeable about tax requirements (or paying someone with
that skillset) for the employee’s benefit, the gig economy worker must bear
those compliance costs themselves. Further, classifying gig economy work-
ers as independent contractors also shifts the economic incidence of taxa-
tion (meaning who bears the economic burden of a tax)63 to the worker
from what the employer, under a traditional employer-employee relation-
ship, would have paid for Social Security and Medicare. This decreases the
horizontal equity of gig economy workers compared to similarly situated
employees. This disparity is in addition to gig economy workers not receiv-
ing non-taxed fringe benefits, such as health insurance, from their em-
ployer, further violating horizontal equity.
59. Id. at 231.
60. Elkins, supra note 44, at 44.
61. Thomas, supra note 3, at 1417.
62. Gerald Prante & Andrew Chamberlain, Economic v. Legal Incidence: Comparing Census Bu-
reau Figures with Tax Foundation Tax Burdens, TAX FOUNDATION (June 9, 2006), https://perma.cc/
A37R-6NQR.
63. Id.
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These fairness issues are apparent upon a closer look at the significant
hurdles gig economy workers face when it comes to paying taxes on earned
income, both in terms of the mechanics of submitting payments as well as
calculating tax liability. As described above in the cabinet-installer scena-
rio, the wage-earning employee receives a paycheck with any withholding
already applied, meaning that their employer has already withheld and re-
mitted to the IRS amounts owed for quarterly payments on behalf of the
employee. Additionally, this employee will receive a W-2 each year sum-
marizing their income to be reported to the IRS. In contrast, the Tasker is
responsible for keeping track of all income and making estimated payments
of their income and employment taxes on a quarterly basis, subject to penal-
ties for failure to comply.64
Furthermore, the process of calculating the correct tax burden for a
taxable year presents an additional challenge for gig economy workers.
First, the Tasker must keep detailed records of every transaction to know
their total income earned each year. Some Taskers, if they make over
$20,000 per year and complete 200 or more transactions, will receive a
Form 1099-K detailing their earnings.65 However, this form does not neces-
sarily capture all activity, like all available deductions, and so the Tasker
must still maintain their own records in order to receive the tax benefits
associated with claiming the Tasker’s expenses.66 With or without a 1099-
K, the Tasker will have to attach a Schedule C to their individual tax re-
turn.67 On a Schedule C, the Tasker takes into account any deductible ex-
penses, including cost recovery via depreciation deductions, to calculate net
profits.68 This Schedule, along with any other forms detailing income de-
rived from other endeavors, is then attached to a Form 1040 to arrive at the
64. Thomas, supra note 3, at 1422 (citing I.R.C. §§ 6654(a), (c)(2) (2012)). Note that these taxation
requirements are not unique to gig economy workers as any employee who fails to remit the requisite
quarterly payments is also subject to penalty. However, one of the benefits of the traditional employer-
employee relationship is that the employer assumes the burden of complying with these taxation require-
ments, thereby relieving their employees of this administrative responsibility. Since employers are gen-
erally more familiar with the withholding and remitting process, employees who permit their employer
to determine the proper withholding amounts and to remit those amounts to the I.R.S. usually do not
trigger any penalty.
65. Am I a TaskRabbit Employee?, TASKRABBIT, https://perma.cc/9FPB-TVDX (last updated Apr.
24, 2019); Understanding Your Form 1099-K, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://perma.cc/78PD-
GSXX (last updated Nov. 5, 2018). Although some gig economy workers qualify over this threshold, the
majority do not and so generally will not receive this tax information.
66. Eileen Ambrose, Taxes and the Gig Economy, AARP (Mar. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/CG36-
Y9F6.
67. Or a Schedule C-EZ, if business expenses are under $5,000. Should I File Schedule C or Sched-
ule C-EZ?, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://perma.cc/WXM7-Q8VW (last updated Aug. 20, 2018)
[hereinafter Should I File].
68. Thomas, supra note 3, at 1418.
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 80 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol80/iss2/6
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\80-2\MON206.txt unknown Seq: 11  1-AUG-19 12:22
2019 GIGGIN’ IN THE 21ST CENTURY 309
Tasker’s taxable income.69 This process requires knowledge of tax require-
ments and budgeting foresight, since taxpayers must take into account their
expected tax burden throughout the year when making financial decisions.
Taskers are further burdened with the additional time spent on ensuring
their compliance with the tax code’s requirements. However, many gig
workers, if not most, are unaware of Schedule C, quarterly estimated pay-
ments, or available deductions.70 This complexity is highlighted by the fact
that only 44% of self-employed income is reported accurately.71
Vertical equity is similarly affected by these burden shifts when com-
paring gig economy workers to service coordinators. As the service coor-
dinators, meaning the employers, have far greater resources available, verti-
cal equity dictates that these taxpayers should bear a proportionately greater
share of the tax burden compared to the individual gig economy worker.
This speaks to the ability-to-pay principle, which maintains “that the tax
burden ought to be related to the taxpayer’s level of economic well-be-
ing.”72 By classifying gig economy workers as independent contractors,
vertical equity between the worker and the employer is decreased because
the gig economy worker, who has a lesser ability to pay, bears a proportion-
ately higher compliance cost than the employers with a greater ability to
pay, or greater level of well-being.
Overall, these increased compliance costs for the Tasker create a dis-
crepancy in horizontal equity compared to the similarly-situated employee,
and in vertical equity compared to the service coordinator. Not only does
the Tasker have to spend significantly more time correctly calculating their
taxable income,73 but the Tasker is also subject to penalty for noncompli-
ance.74 Equity principles are likewise violated in shifting the burden of re-
cord-keeping from the employer to the gig economy worker, as this results
in “gig workers spend[ing] disproportionately large [amounts of] resources
dealing with tax compliance obligations compared to relatively small
amounts of income,”75 thus creating inequity between two workers doing
the same job,76 as well as between the gig economy worker and employer.
69. Should I File, supra note 67.
70. Paul Caron, WSJ: The Blind Spot in the Sharing Economy—Tax Collection?, TAXPROFBLOG
(May 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/3S69-SS2D.
71. User-Friendly Taxpaying, supra note 39, at 1534. Furthermore, this results in a loss of $100
billion in tax revenue per year. Id. at 1511 n.2 (citing Tax Gap for Tax Year 2006: Overview tbl.1
(2012), INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Jan. 6, 2012), https://perma.cc/GE72-2Q7Y).
72. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 42, at 91.
73. ALASTAIR FITZPAYNE, SHELLY STEWARD & ETHAN POLLACK, Tax Simplification for Indepen-
dent Workers 1 (Aspen Inst., Future of Work Initiative, 2018).
74. Atmore, supra note 1, at 889; see also supra text accompanying note 64. R
75. Thomas, supra note 3, at 1434. R
76. Id. at 1418.
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2. Difficulties Associated with Business Expense Deductions
Intertwined with the payment of income taxes are difficulties associ-
ated with deducting business expenses. Specifically relevant to the gig
economy worker is understanding the process of claiming available deduc-
tions, both in terms of correctly identifying deductible expenses and in
terms of maintaining adequate records of expenses.
Claiming available business expense deductions begins with correctly
identifying deductible expenses. However, this poses a significant challenge
for many gig economy workers considering that, according to a survey from
the National Association for the Self-Employed, “47% [of gig workers]
didn’t know about any tax deductions, expenses or credits that could be
claimed related to their on-demand platform income.”77 Since one signifi-
cant benefit of being self-employed is the availability of business-associated
deductions, missing out on available deductions greatly decreases gig work-
ers’ marginal earnings in comparison to similarly-situated employees,
thereby creating an imbalance in horizontal equity.
For those gig economy workers who are aware of available deductions,
one of the primary challenges in identifying deductible expenses is distin-
guishing between personal and business expenses. Considering that the typ-
ical gig worker uses their personal equipment, vehicle, or tools when com-
pleting a task, determining when an item is being used for work, versus
when it is being put to personal use, can be difficult for even the savvy
taxpayer.78 As the gig worker may deduct business-related expenses, but
not personal use expenses, navigating the intricacies of cost-recovery poses
a particularly complicated problem for the gig economy worker.79 Addi-
tionally, this confusion and uncertainty may cause some workers to reduce
their hours or even discourage them from participating in the gig economy
entirely.80
Maintaining adequate records of deductible business expenses poses
yet another obstacle for the gig economy worker. Determining which
records need to be kept adds to the gig economy worker’s compliance costs,
and failing to preserve appropriate expense records results in the non-reim-
bursement of those expenses.81 These issues further decrease the system’s
77. BRUCKNER, supra note 4, at 12 (emphasis added).
78. Thomas, supra note 3, at 1454.
79. Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Tax Issues in the Sharing Economy: Implications for Workers 6
(Bos. Coll. Law Sch.: Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 480, May 14, 2018),
https://perma.cc/X3MQ-UPMJ (last revised May 15, 2018) (noting that “[t]he key issue that is likely to
arise for those operating in the sharing economy is the need to apportion expenses between business and
personal use.”).
80. Thomas, supra note 3, at 1441–42.
81. Id. at 1430.
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horizontal equity regarding gig economy workers and similarly situated em-
ployees. Additionally, these issues also decrease the system’s vertical eq-
uity each time a gig economy worker fails to take an available deduction
that would otherwise be available to a service coordinator.
3. Added Complexity: The TCJA’s Addition of § 199A
Enacted December 22, 2017, the TCJA threw a wildcard into the mix
by adding § 199A82 to the tax code.83 Broadly, § 199A allows a below-the-
line deduction84 of 20% of qualified business income (“QBI”),85 subject to
a phase-out,86 for tax years beginning after 2017.87 As the deduction is
available to independent contractors who operate as sole proprietorships
and partnerships,88 gig economy workers generally may use this provision
to further reduce their tax burden.89 Most gig economy workers will fall
under the threshold for the phase-out, which begins at taxable income over
$157,000 for single-filers ($315,000 for joint filers).90 Since the more com-
plex aspects of § 199A begin at the point where the phase-out takes effect,
this comment omits a detailed discussion of those provisions.91
While in effect, § 199A swings the pendulum of equity in favor of the
gig economy worker compared to the employee. This is because § 199A,
via the 20% reduction in QBI, reduces the gig economy worker’s tax liabil-
ity in comparison to a similarly situated employee. However, considering
82. I.R.C. § 199A (2017).
83. Note that this deduction was created as “a corollary tax benefit to non-C corporation busi-
nesses” who received a large tax rate cut in the TCJA. William A. Bailey, Mechanics of the New Sec.
199A Deduction for Qualified Business Income, J. ACCT. (May 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/H383-HNW4.
84. See Memorandum of Legal Advice from Dan Whyte, Chief Legal Counsel, Mont. Dep’t of
Revenue, to Mike Kadas, Dir., Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, H.R. 1 2017 Part II, § 11011-Pass-Through
Deduction 2 (Jan. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/WQN7-RFGH; Thomas, supra note 3, at 1457 (taxpayers
will still be able to elect whether to take the itemized or standard deduction).
85. “Qualified business income” means “the net amount of qualified items of income, gain, deduc-
tion, and loss with respect to any qualified trade or business of the taxpayer” for any taxable year. I.R.C.
§ 199A(c)(1).
86. Id. § 199A(e)(2)(A).
87. Id. § 199A(i). The deduction is subject to certain limitations that are largely inapplicable to
typical gig economy workers (for example, excluded from the deduction is income earned in “a trade or
business involving the performance of services in the fields of health, law, [and] accounting,” when the
taxpayer’s taxable income exceeds a specified threshold). See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Provision 11011
Section 199A - Qualified Business Income Deduction FAQs, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://perma
.cc/5EF7-QG7D (last updated Mar. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Deduction FAQs].
88. Deduction FAQs, supra note 87. Section 199A applies to domestic businesses operated as sole
proprietorships or through partnerships, S corporations, trusts, or estates. Id.
89. Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Is New Code Section 199A Really Going to Turn Us All Into Inde-
pendent Contractors? 3 (Bos. Coll. Law Sch.: Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper Jan.
12, 2018), https://perma.cc/3BYF-QDTW (last revised Mar. 27, 2019).
90. I.R.C. § 199A(e)(2)(A).
91. See generally Deduction FAQs, supra note 87.
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the difficulty the majority of gig economy workers have claiming deduc-
tions and the complexity of § 199A, many gig economy workers may unin-
tentionally forgo this benefit. In a related problem, this provision potentially
distorts taxpayer behavior through incentivizing a shift from employee sta-
tus to independent contractor status in order to take advantage of the deduc-
tion.92 Exacerbating this issue is § 199A’s sunset provision, which elimi-
nates the deduction after 2025, making long-term planning more difficult.93
Once the deduction is no longer in effect, a potentially large number of
taxpayers may find themselves classified as independent contractors when
they otherwise may have sought employee status, but without the benefit of
§ 199A’s deduction.
Lastly, since taxpayers who incorrectly calculate their tax liability face
a penalty for the underpayment of income tax, gig economy workers who
incorrectly calculate the § 199A deduction may additionally be required to
pay a penalty for any associated underpayment.94 Due to the rather high
publicity of § 199A’s 20% deduction, many gig economy workers may pos-
sess sufficient awareness of the deduction in order to claim it on their re-
turns. However, these same taxpayers may lack the equivalent knowledge
of other tax provisions necessary to correctly calculate their taxable income
in order to avoid any penalty.95 Since these taxpayers are more likely to
commit calculation errors, the complexity of § 199A poses a hidden threat
to a subset of taxpayers generally ill-equipped to mitigate the risk.
IV. MOVING FORWARD: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH FOR ADDRESSING
THE SYSTEM’S INADEQUACIES
While full-scale solutions to these problems and others will likely in-
volve a broad re-working of the tax code’s treatment of “independent con-
tractor” and “employee,96 with no such solution on the horizon, there are a
number of changes that, in the interim, can increase the protection for gig
economy workers, while making the process by which gig economy work-
ers are taxed more fair and more efficient. These changes include imple-
menting mandatory withholding and reporting provisions applicable to ser-
vice coordinators; facilitating deductions for business expenses; and clarify-
ing and heightening awareness of the § 199A business deduction.
92. Oei & Ring, supra note 89, at 2–5. However, “a mere relabeling of a previous employer/
employee relationship risks rejection, unless accompanied by meaningful actual change.” Id. at 5.
93. I.R.C. § 199A(i).
94. Id. § 6662(a)–(b).
95. See supra Part II.
96. SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, A PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER” 5–8 (Brookings Inst., The Hamilton
Project Discussion Paper No. 2015-10, 2015).
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A. Mandatory Wage Withholding & Reporting
The first step towards a fairer system involves implementing
mandatory withholding and reporting laws for service coordinators. These
changes, respectively, would require service coordinators to withhold a cer-
tain amount from each payment to a service provider and would eliminate
the minimum threshold of $20,000 earned income over 200 or more trans-
actions in a taxable year for when service coordinators are required to send
out 1099-K forms to their service providers. These changes would address
both horizontal and vertical equity while simultaneously increasing compli-
ance, and are an immediate way to make the system more efficient.
Requiring withholding by service coordinators and eliminating the
1099-K minimum threshold would greatly alleviate the compliance burden
on service providers. Since the service coordinator already maintains re-
ceipts from all transactions throughout the year, eliminating the 1099-K
minimum threshold (resulting in mandatory 1099-K mailings to all service
providers) would not greatly add to the service coordinators’ costs. On the
service provider’s end, receiving a 1099-K would signal to the worker that
some action needs to be taken while also providing a necessary synopsis of
income earned. Shifting the burden of withholding to the service coordina-
tor would likewise simplify the taxation process for the service provider,
while also lessening budgeting concerns. This speaks directly to horizontal
equity, as the service provider, the Tasker, would spend a considerably
lesser amount of time on tax preparation, making the Tasker’s cost of com-
pliance more similar to that of an employee. Shifting the burden of with-
holding also addresses vertical equity in that it shifts that administrative
cost to the service coordinator, who, due to economies of scale, is much
better situated for that role compared to the service providers.97 In addition
to making the system more fair, these changes would also increase effi-
ciency by freeing up service providers’ time that would otherwise be spent
on compliance, while not significantly impacting the service coordinator
who already has the basic tax compliance infrastructure in place. This
would likely result in a higher rate of compliance, thereby reducing the tax
gap.98
Determining the amount of withholding poses some difficulties, both
in the actual percentage withheld and considering that service providers
may work for multiple service coordinators, have other employment gener-
ally, or may have spousal income that affects withholding amounts. How-
97. Id. at 18.
98. Id.
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ever, these issues are not insurmountable.99 Take for example a Tasker who
also works for Uber. Both service coordinators, TaskRabbit and Uber, could
each ask whether the worker wants that platform to be considered the
worker’s primary platform. Whichever platform the worker chooses would
then withhold a certain percentage of income, while the other, non-primary
platforms would not impose any withholding, similar to how employees
with multiple employers can change the amount of withholding applied by
each successive employer. While this does not address the spousal income
issue, it would at least err towards a larger return at year’s end for joint
filers, instead of a deficit, which also reduces the IRS’ administrative
cost.100
Determining the actual percentage to be withheld is more complicated.
A failed provision in a 2017 bill before the Senate would have required
service coordinators to withhold 5% of workers’ income earned, up to
$20,000.101 Others have advocated for a sliding scale between 6% and 16%,
depending on a worker’s projected marginal tax rate, or a flat rate of
10%.102 Overall, any amount of withholding would be a step in the right
direction, with a flat rate being preferable at this point in order to simplify
the transition. Additionally, a flat rate would serve to reduce the IRS’ ad-
ministrative costs by reducing possible complexity. Following the imple-
mentation of mandatory withholding at a set percentage, a tiered approach
should be considered alongside the data.
B. Facilitating the Process of Claiming Business Deductions
Two changes can be made to alleviate the added costs associated with
claiming available business-related deductions: implementing a standard
business deduction103 and creating a small-business owner database on the
IRS’ website for tracking business expenses.104
The standard business deduction would be available only to businesses
and would operate as an alternative to the present system of compiling and
99. As an initial matter, the possibility of overcoming these issues is apparent because these with-
holding requirements apply to employees as well, with relatively little issue. However, the withholding
calculation for employees is generally calculated by the employer, who often hires bookkeepers or ac-
countants who possess specialized skills to determine proper withholding amounts. Since gig economy
workers do not have an employer available to perform this calculation, they are responsible for deter-
mining withholding amounts on their own under the present system.
100. This is because the process of notifying taxpayers of deficiencies and then collecting those
amounts overdue costs the IRS more in administrative costs than it does for the IRS to simply provide a
taxpayer who has overpaid their taxes over the course of a taxable year with a tax return.
101. See NEW GIG Act of 2017, S. 1549, 115th Cong. § 7706(s)(2) (2017).
102. Thomas, supra note 3, at 1449–52. R
103. Credit for this proposal goes to Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, who first proposed the idea in
Taxing the Gig Economy, supra note 3. For the details of her proposal, see id. at 1454–67.
104. Thomas, supra note 3, at 1549–50.
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recording all business expenses over the taxable year.105 This would pro-
vide business owners with the choice of either “itemizing” their business
expenses, as is presently the case, or claiming the standard business deduc-
tion amount in lieu of recovering their specific business expenses.106 In
essence, this would parallel the more familiar personal income tax dichot-
omy of either itemizing deductions or taking the standard deduction.
Determining the amount of the standard business deduction will need
to be addressed. One option is to set the deduction at a fixed amount, like
the personal income tax standard deduction, while another option is to
structure the deduction as a fixed percentage of the taxpayer’s gross busi-
ness receipts.107 In keeping with the goal of simplifying the gig workers’
tax compliance efforts, a fixed dollar amount is the preferable option at this
point. A fixed dollar amount is more familiar to the average taxpayer, who
likely has elected to take the standard deduction on their past personal in-
come tax returns, and would not require any additional steps, other than
making the election. This likely will result in a smaller deduction for gig
workers on average, but ideally, once the IRS’ business expense tracking
database is established, most gig workers will choose to “itemize” their bus-
iness expenses instead of claiming the standard business deduction, to better
reflect their actual expenses.108
Overall, implementing a standard business deduction now would
greatly assist gig workers who either do not know about business expense
deductions or do not understand the nuances associated with business ex-
pense deductibility in general. Additionally, the standard business deduc-
tion would reduce the gig workers’ compliance costs by reducing or elimi-
nating the need to maintain receipts and records of all business expenses
over the course of the taxable year. Thus, both the rate of compliance and
efficiency would be increased, while also creating a system that is fairer to
the unsophisticated gig worker.109
For a long-term solution, the IRS should develop an online database
that assists business owners in tracking their expenses.110 To utilize the
database, business owners, including gig workers, would take pictures of
their receipts and invoices and upload the photos to the database through an
app.111 When uploading, the taxpayer would categorize each particular ex-
105. Id. at 1454.
106. Id. at 1457.
107. Id.
108. This, of course, would only change the behavior of those whose deductible business expenses
exceed the standard business deduction.
109. Thomas, supra note 3, at 1454.
110. See User-Friendly Taxpaying, supra note 39, at 1549–50.
111. Id. at 1550.
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pense based on a drop-down list of options.112 The database would store the
uploaded information, including the picture itself, in an easily-accessible
format, and could be programmed to generate an initial summary of likely
deductible expenses for the taxable year.113 This would enable gig workers
to more accurately maintain their records while also providing the IRS with
a direct means of oversight, assisting with the system’s administrability.
Together, these two ideas provide both short-term and long-term solu-
tions to gig workers’ acute problem with claiming business expense deduc-
tions. The standard business deduction could be implemented immediately
and could operate either as a temporary stop-gap measure114 or as a perma-
nent addition to the tax code, while the business expense database, follow-
ing its development, is preferable over the long-term as it would enable
more precise deduction tracking.
C. Addressing § 199A Issues
The problems created with the addition of § 199A largely center
around issues with knowledge—both in awareness and in requirements—of
the provision. This issue manifests in one of two ways, either: (1) gig econ-
omy workers are unaware of the provision and so will miss out on a signifi-
cant benefit available to them; or (2) if they are aware of the provision, they
lack holistic knowledge of the tax implications associated with claiming the
20% deduction under § 199A.115 These tax implications concern the height-
ened risk posed by the associated penalty provision116 and the Section’s
sunset provision.117
Gig economy workers who are unaware of § 199A will not claim the
deduction, which increases horizontal inequity. First, the government will
expect taxpayers to claim the deduction if they qualify and will base its tax
policy on that assumption. For the gig workers who do not claim the deduc-
tion, this will cause a cascading effect on their economic prosperity com-
pared to those gig economy workers who do claim the deduction. Second,
since this deduction was created as “a corollary tax benefit to non-C corpo-
ration businesses” who received a large tax rate cut in the TCJA, gig econ-
omy workers who do not claim the deduction will be reducing their relative
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. As a temporary stop-gap measure, this would potentially pose the same issue for long-term
planning as does the § 199A sunset provision. Accordingly, if the standard business deduction is de-
signed to only be a temporary addition to the tax code, then the IRS should focus its efforts on raising
public awareness, similar to the proposals presented in infra Part IV(C).
115. See Thomas, supra note 3, at 1452–55.
116. I.R.C. § 6662 (2017).
117. Id. § 199A(i).
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well-being compared to that of the corporate world.118 To combat the nega-
tive implications for those taxpayers who are unaware of § 199A, the IRS
should strive to increase public knowledge of the deduction through easily
understood and easily accessible publications, characterizing it as a tempo-
rary relief measure for small business owners. By highlighting the fact that
§ 199A is a temporary measure, this will help increase the public’s aware-
ness that it is not a permanent provision. Each state’s Secretary of State
website should also include easily-accessible information on this provision.
With this increase in awareness of § 199A comes an increase in poten-
tial negative repercussions associated with incomplete knowledge of the
provision. By lowering the threshold for triggering a penalty attributable to
the understatement of income, the provision essentially sets a trap for the
unwary independent contractor. Since the § 199A deduction is designed to
be applied after any other below-the-line deductions are applied,119 it is far
too likely that the unsavvy taxpayer overlooks this nuance and applies
§ 199A prior to applying other applicable below-the-line deductions, thus
triggering the penalty provision. For example, take the following hypotheti-
cal:
A gig economy worker earns $20,000 after taking any applicable above-the-
line deductions. The taxpayer also has $1,000 of below-the-line deductions
available. Now, the unsavvy taxpayer knows that they may claim a 20%
deduction under § 199A, but they are not aware of the importance of the
order of operations:
♦ If the taxpayer incorrectly applies the 20% deduction at
this point to their $20,000 of income, this will result in
a $4,000 deduction from their taxable income to equal
$16,000. Then, subtracting out their below-the-line de-
duction of $1,000 equals a total taxable income amount
of $15,000.
♦ However, the correct way to claim the deduction is to
first apply any applicable below-the-line deductions,
and then apply the 20% § 199A deduction: $20,000 mi-
nus the below-the-line deduction of $1,000 equals
$19,000. Then applying § 199A, a 20% deduction from
$19,000 equals a total taxable income amount of
$15,200.
Since the incorrect order of operations results in a $15,000 taxable income
amount, while the correct order of operations results in a taxable income
amount of $15,200, the unsavvy taxpayer in this scenario would trigger the
understatement of income provision120 and be subject to the corresponding
118. Bailey, supra note 83.
119. I.R.C. §§ 199A(c)(1), (3).
120. Id. § 6662(a).
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penalty.121 Note that the taxpayer here would trigger the penalty provision
for understating their taxable income by only $200, and only for mistakenly
applying § 199A (a below-the-line deduction) prior to all other below-the-
line deductions. To address this issue, in disseminating information regard-
ing § 199A, the IRS should be sure to include instructions on how to apply
§ 199A to arrive at the correct tax liability, similar to the above hypotheti-
cal.
Additionally, debate exists over whether the penalty provision applies
only to understatements of income directly due to claiming the § 199A de-
duction, or if the penalty provision applies more broadly to any understate-
ment of income, whether or not attributable to claiming a deduction under
§ 199A.122 This is important because under the latter reading, all a gig
economy worker needs to do to potentially subject themselves to a penalty
is claim a deduction under § 199A, thereby greatly increasing their financial
exposure. Due to the complexities associated with correctly calculating all
business expense deductions, it is extremely likely that the average gig
economy worker will unintentionally trigger the applicability of the penalty
provision. This essentially creates a “roll the dice” scenario where gig econ-
omy workers will simply have to hope that the IRS does not choose to audit
their returns. Thus, as an initial matter, the IRS needs to clarify which inter-
pretation is the correct reading of the provision in order to determine the
scope of the potential for liability.
As a secondary matter, to address the issue of incomplete knowledge
of § 199A, any governmental publication discussing the availability of
§ 199A’s deduction should include a warning alerting taxpayers to the pos-
sibility of a penalty for miscalculating their taxable income, as mentioned
above. Since the penalty provision is tucked away in an entirely different
section of the tax code, with no mention of any applicable penalty within
the text of § 199A, the chances of a typical gig economy worker knowing
about the slim margin of error for triggering a penalty are extremely low.
The government created § 199A expecting to incentivize small business
owners to claim the deduction, and so should proactively seek to educate
121. While the penalty provision itself will not result in a massive monetary penalty for the gig
economy worker, it will still result in the taxpayer having to pay the IRS additional sums for the incor-
rect calculation. Additionally, the IRS’ administrability costs will rise due to taxpayers not understand-
ing how to correctly apply the § 199A deduction, resulting in the government spending valuable re-
sources to recoup relatively small amounts of money.
122. Memorandum Accompanying Presentation from Samuel A. Donaldson, Professor of Law, Ga.
State Univ., Senior Counsel, Perkins Coie LLP, to 66th Annual Mont. Tax Inst., Alexander Blewett III
Sch. Of Law, Univ. of Mont., Annual Income Tax Update 17 (Oct. 19, 2018); but see Tony Nitti,
Understanding the New Sec. 199A Business Income Deduction, THE TAX ADVISER (Apr. 1, 2018), https:/
/perma.cc/ZTB5-EW6X.
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this subset of taxpayers about the possible consequences associated with the
provision.
Lastly, § 199A’s sunset provision creates the potential for issues in the
near-future, when the provision expires in 2025.123 Gig economy workers
who have begun to include the deduction’s benefit in their budgeting after a
few years of successfully claiming it on their returns will be faced with a
significant and unexpected financial burden upon the deduction’s expira-
tion. The short-lived nature of the provision only adds to the uncertainty gig
economy workers already face, and disproportionately affects a subset of
workers who lack the means and the knowledge to stay informed about
changes to the tax code. The key to alleviating some of these issues again
comes down to increasing the availability of information detailing the
lesser-known aspects of this deduction, focusing on using language that
alerts taxpayers of potential changes, like calling § 199A a “temporary”
provision. Additionally, the IRS should disseminate an alert to all taxpayers
who claimed a § 199A deduction in the year prior to the provision’s expira-
tion warning them of the need to adjust expectations. In this way, gig econ-
omy workers (and all other taxpayers who claim a § 199A deduction) will
have an opportunity to adjust their budgeting while also reducing the IRS’
administrative costs the following year.
V. CONCLUSION: FUTURE OUTLOOK
Implementing the suggestions described in this comment, including
mandatory wage withholding and reporting for service coordinators; imple-
mentation of the standard business deduction and an expense-tracking
database on the IRS website; and increased taxpayer knowledge through
easily-accessible publications, warnings as to possible penalties, and alerts
regarding the sunset provision, would result in a significant improvement in
the average gig economy worker’s economic well-being.
These steps would benefit the gig economy worker by increasing the
system’s equity while also reducing compliance costs associated with pay-
ing taxes. In turn, by reducing compliance costs for this large sector of the
economy, overall compliance would increase. Along with gig economy
workers, the IRS also would see a significant benefit from changing with-
holding and reporting laws, as this would result in a more administrable
system. This would decrease the tax gap by decreasing the IRS’ administra-
tive costs while simultaneously increasing its revenue. Finally, although
these changes would somewhat increase compliance costs for service coor-
dinators, these taxpayers are better equipped to handle wage withholding
and reporting than gig economy workers. Accordingly, the compliance cost
123. I.R.C. § 199A(i).
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across taxpayers as a whole would be reduced, thereby allowing more op-
portunity for economic growth instead of time spent on compliance. Thus,
these changes would have the net effect of improving the economic status
of all affected parties, while simultaneously addressing the issues caused by
our traditional employment classification model.
Going forward, large-scale changes will need to occur for our tax pol-
icy to catch up to our society’s quickly-changing economic reality. Until
then, the proposals contained within this comment deserve a critical look,
with the potential benefits derived therefrom having the ability to increase
everyone’s well-being.
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